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1. Introduction
On 5 June 2014, the German parliament (Deutscher 
Bundestag) passed the Law on the Further Devel-
opment of the Financial Structure and Quality in 
Statutory Health Insurance (Gesetz zur Weiterent-
wicklung der Finanzstruktur und der Qualität in 
der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung). According 
to the Federal Minister of Health, Hermann Gröhe, 
the aim of the law is to “establish fair competition 
between sickness funds and to effectively strength-
en the financial structure of the Statutory Health In-
surance” (Bundesgesundheitsministerium 2014; au-
thor’s translation). Thus, Hermann Gröhe continues 
the tradition of his predecessors: Once again, com-
petition is evoked as the key to ensuring the finan-
cial sustainability of the German healthcare system 
and to improving the quality of medical provision.
Almost 20 years have passed since the Healthcare 
Structure Act (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz) and 
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the introduction of free choice of health insurers 
in 1996. The intention of the Healthcare Structure 
Act was to transform a system of coercion into a 
free market for low-priced and high-quality health 
insurance. Since then, more than 40 healthcare 
reforms have been adopted – and the political au-
thorities have almost always claimed that their goal 
was to strengthen competition. But a closer look 
into the reform packages reveals that in contrast to 
the pronouncements, the German government has 
in no way followed a direct path to enhancing com-
petition in the last 20 years. Since at least the in-
troduction of the Health Fund (‘Gesundheitsfonds’) 
in 2009, an obvious trend towards more standardi-
zation and further levelling can be observed. The 
most recent healthcare reform in 2014 confirms this 
trend in a striking manner. German government is 
planning to replace additional flat-rate premiums by 
additional income-related contributions, although 
flat-rate premiums exert much higher competition 
pressure.
2. Competition in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance System
According to Cassel et al. (2008: 37) competition in 
the healthcare system can be separated into three 
markets: First, the insurance market with sickness 
funds that compete for subscribers via premium 
rates. Other competitive instruments are the or-
ganizational structure of medical provision and 
specific services. Explicitly not part of competition 
is the benefit catalogue, which is mostly defined by 
law and the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuss). Secondly, the market for medi-
cal treatments, where service providers compete for 
patients. Competition parameters are the type and 
quality of medical treatment as well as services such 
as appointment management. Finally, the market 
for selective contracts. In this market, physicians, 
groups of physicians, medical institutions and sup-
pliers compete for individual contracts and agree-
ments with sickness funds. Those agreements range 
from simple discount arrangements to the complete 
take-over of the healthcare responsibility for whole 
regions or population groups.
The political discussion in Germany focuses on 
the markets for insurances and selective contracts. 
This is due to serious transparency and principal-
agent-problems on the market for treatments. The 
particularities of ‘health’ as a confidence and an ex-
perience good (Breyer et al., 2013: 190) restrict the 
functional capacity of competition on the market 
for treatments. Therefore, it is much more feasible 
to enhance competition on the other two markets 
and, by doing so, to influence the market for treat-
ments indirectly.
2.1 Competition on the Insurance Market – Past 
and Present
The history of competition in the Statutory Health 
Insurance (SHI) starts in 1992 with the ‘Healthcare 
Structure Law’. In the context of the so-called ‘Great 
Subject-Matter Coalition’, negotiations between 
representatives of government and opposition took 
place in a three-week closed convention in Bad 
Lahnstein, under exclusion of both the public and 
interest groups (Wasem, 1998: 21). To this day, the 
proposed concept which was designed, the ‘Lahn-
stein Compromise’, represents an important break 
in German healthcare policy. In 1996 the system of 
attribution by law was abandoned and the insured 
persons were given the right to choose their sickness 
fund. Since the sickness funds are hardly allowed to 
modify the benefit catalogue, competition is almost 
completely based on differences in the contribution 
rates – and the health insurance schemes actively 
took the opportunity for price competition. In 2008, 
contribution rates varied from 13.4 to 17.4 percent 
(Eibich et al., 2011: 3). At the same time, the assess-
able income ceiling amounts to € 3,600 per month. 
Therefore, by changing their sickness fund, high 
earners could save up to €72 per month (the em-
ployer’s contribution is not considered). Even an 
average earner with an income of € 2,550 could save 
€51 per month. Thus, there was a noticeable finan-
cial incentive to switch from expensive to cheaper 
health insurances. Price competition, however, did 
not lead to the expected results and substantial 
structural changes. From 2000 to 2009, on average 
only five percent of insured people switched their 
sickness fund (Schmitz et al., 2011).
The poor competitive pressure, which was per-
ceived as inadequate, ultimately resulted in the 
development of new reform concepts. As early as 
2002, the German government set up an expert 
commission to elaborate a proposal to ensure the 
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financial sustainability of the SHI (Kommission 
für die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der so-
zialen Sicherungssysteme), but the commission 
failed to come to an internal agreement. Instead, 
the commission presented two diametrically op-
posed reform models: Citizens’ Insurance (Bürger-
versicherung) and Flat-Rate Health Contribution 
Model (Gesundheitsprämienmodell). And whereas 
the Social Democrats (SPD) proposed the Citizens’ 
Insurance, the Christian Democrats adopted the 
Flat-Rate Health Contribution Model. The dispute 
went far beyond the question as to what extent 
competition is needed in the healthcare system. It 
revealed fundamental differences between the two 
German major parties with regard to their eco-
nomical and distributional thinking. The Citizens’ 
Insurance is based on the enlargement of the basis 
for contribution assessment and the abolishment 
of private health insurance. Hence, this reform, es-
sentially, does not aim at increased competition, but 
tries to improve social justice. In contrast, the Flat-
Rate Health Contribution Model focuses more on 
economic aspects. It releases employers from the 
obligation to pay half of the contributions of their 
employees. Thus, it tries to prevent increasing ancil-
lary wage costs. Moreover, the introduction of capi-
tation fees would strengthen price competition (for 
more information about the two reform models see 
Kommission, 2003).
The campaign for the federal election on 18 Sep-
tember 2005 was very much focused on health 
policy and the dispute about ‘Bürgerversicherung’ 
and ‘Gesundheitsprämienmodell’. Both parties an-
nounced that, in the event of an election victory, 
they would introduce a comprehensive health care 
reform act (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2005: 54 and CDU-
Bundesvorstand, CSU-Parteivorstand, 2005: 26).
Since the election resulted in the formation of a 
grand coalition, the new government was caught 
in a dilemma. During the campaign, both parties 
had emphasized the urgency of a reorganization 
of the SHI. Now, they saw themselves obligated to 
fulfil their announcement. However, the two ex-
isting reform concepts were not compatible with 
each other. Finally, the Scientific Advisory Council 
to the Federal Ministry of Finance (Wissenschaftli-
cher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen) 
offered a solution. From the start it was the inten-
tion of the Advisory Council to find a practicable 
way “to strengthen competition in the SHI without 
determining a specific financing alternative.” (Wis-
senschaftlicher Beirat, 2005: 1; author’s translation). 
Based on the ideas of Richter (2005), the advisory 
council presented a consensual model which ulti-
mately resulted in the introduction of the Health 
Fund in 2009 (Competition Reinforcement Law).
With the Health Fund, a uniform contribution rate 
for all statutory sickness funds was established. 
From then on, sickness funds received standardized, 
morbidity-oriented contributions for each insured 
person directly from the Health Fund. Therefore, 
due to the risk adjustment scheme, sickness funds 
with an above average number of ill insured per-
sons obtain higher contributions from the Health 
Fund than sickness funds with comparatively few 
ill insured people. If the premium a sickness fund 
receives from the pool is not sufficient, it is obliged 
to raise additional contributions from its members 
(at the beginning both income-related contribution 
rates and flat-rate premiums were possible; since 
2011 flat-rate premiums are mandatory). Converse-
ly, if the contributions are higher than its expendi-
ture, the sickness fund can give bonus payments to 
its members. Thus, since 2009 competition has no 
longer been due to income-related contributions, 
but instead flat-rate premiums.
The Health Fund was a perfect political compro-
mise between the two major parties. On the one 
hand, the solidarity-based financing of the SHI was 
preserved. Moreover, the basis for contribution as-
sessment was expanded by higher tax subsidies. 
This can be seen as a first step towards Citizens’ In-
surance. From this point of view, the new financing 
concept was a clear step in the direction of more 
levelling. On the other hand, the introduction of 
flat-rate premiums corresponded with the Flat-Rate 
Health Contribution Model and was associated 
with the expectation of stronger competition.
 Indeed, the new financing mechanism intensified 
competition on the insurance market significantly. 
The introduction of flat-rate premiums has resulted 
in a doubling of the individual change-probability 
from 5 to 10 percent (Eibich et al., 2011: 9). Obvi-
ously, flat-rate premiums have increased price trans-
parency. Additionally, in the old system the contri-
butions were deducted from an employee’s monthly 
wage and passed on to the health insurance. In the 
new system, the employee has to pay the additional 
flat-rate premium directly. This difference is of high 
psychological importance and results in stronger 
competition in the new system, although in the old 
system potential savings had been greater (Schulze-
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Ehring, Köster, 2010: 8).
The higher competitive pressure had its conse-
quences. In April 2010, the City BKK was declared 
insolvent (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2012) by the 
German Federal (Social) Insurance Office (Bun-
desversicherungsamt). Shortly thereafter the Ger-
man government passed a new financing reform 
(GKV-Finanzierungsgesetz, 2011). The standard-
ized contribution rate was increased from 14.9 to 
15.5 percent from January 1, 2011. In fact, the in-
crease could not prevent the bankruptcy of the City 
BKK (Bundesversicherungsamt, 2011). However, 
due to the increasing and the sustained economic 
upswing, the necessity of additional flat-rate pre-
miums diminished progressively (Henke and Rich-
ter, 2013: 17). At the present time no sickness fund 
requires any additional premium (Bundesministe-
rium für Gesundheit, 2013). 
However, the less sickness funds require an addi-
tional premium, the higher the economic risk if a 
sickness fund does try to introduce such a premium. 
A loss of members between 10 and 40 percent is fea-
sible (Ulrich, 2014: 10). Therefore, the most impor-
tant aim of the sickness funds is to avoid additional 
premiums. The increase of the standardized contri-
bution rate has suspended price competition on the 
insurance market.
The recent Law on the Further Development of 
the Financial Structure and Quality in SHI (Gesetz 
zur Weiterentwicklung der Finanzstruktur und der 
Qualität in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung) 
is an attempt to reanimate competition on the in-
surance market. The aim of the government is to 
establish a moderate but functioning price competi-
tion: “The situation, that a single sickness fund [City 
BKK] was forced to require an additional premium 
while many other sickness funds had much better 
means […] had led to an undesired dominance of 
price competition” (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Weiterentwicklung der Finanzstruktur und der 
Qualität in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, 
2014: 1; author’s translation). Consequently, what 
is demanded is a functioning price mechanism 
which does not exert too much pressure on sickness 
funds. For this purpose, the German government is 
planning to introduce two changes from 1 January 
2015: First, the standardized contribution rate will 
be reduced from 15.5 to 14.6 percent. The resulting 
financing gap of 11 billion euro (or 0.9 percentage 
points) shall force most sickness funds to introduce 
additional premiums. In doing so, the government 
follows the recommendation of many health econo-
mists (e.g. Greß and Wasem, 2009). However, the 
changes go beyond those recommendations: From 
1 January 2015 additional premiums will only be al-
lowed in the form of income-related contributions. 
This takes account of the fact that flat-rate premi-
ums exert much higher competition pressure.
2.2 Competition on the Market for Selective 
Contracts – Past and Present
Numerous studies confirm that German healthcare, 
compared to other OECD countries, is character-
ized by high costs, ruptures in treatment when tran-
sitioning from one medical sector to another and 
low information flow between the service providers 
(e.g. Schoen et al., 2011). The reasons for this are 
well-known: First, care is still dominated by uniform 
contracts between the traditional associations of 
the sickness funds and the service providers. Com-
petition for contracts and the provision of care is 
very limited. Second, there is a lack of cooperation 
between physicians and other medical professions 
such as highly qualified nurses or caregivers. Third, 
medical sectors are largely separated and each sec-
tor has its own specific compensation system, budg-
et, planning structure etc. A lack of transparency 
and false incentives result in inefficient diagnostic 
processes and unnecessary double treatments. This 
occurs not only at the interface between outpatient 
and inpatient treatment, but also within sectors, 
such as the decision process between specialists and 
primary care physicians.
Therefore, the German government has introduced 
various laws in the last 15 years. These aimed to 
encourage competition for care concepts between 
health insurances and more leeway for players in 
the various sectors of health care (Amelung, 2008). 
To this day, several different possibilities for in-
dividual contracts between physicians, sickness 
funds, industry etc. have been established. Spe-
cial forms of the provision of healthcare in Ger-
many range from Group Contracts (Section 73 a 
SGB[Sozialgesetzbuch = Social Insurance Code] 
V) to Pilot Projects (Sections 63-65 SGB V), Gen-
eral Practitioner-Centred Models (Section 73 b 
SGB), Particular Outpatient Care (Section 73 c SGB 
V), Integrated Care (Section 140 a-d SGB V), and 
Disease Management Programmes (Section 137 
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f-g SGB V). Apart from Group Contracts and Dis-
ease Management Programmes, all of these special 
forms allow selective transactions. With the excep-
tion of General Practitioner-Centred Models, all of 
them are interdisciplinary and most of them even 
cross-sectoral (Sachverständigenrat, 2007).
The German government placed its greatest hope 
in Integrated Care (Section 140 a-d SGB V). Inte-
grated care was introduced in 2000 via the Health 
Care Act 2000. However, at the outset, the effects 
were minimal because the conclusion of contracts 
required the approval of the physicians’ associa-
tions. Only since 2004 and the Healthcare Moderni-
zation Act have individual physicians and physician 
networks been able to become direct contract part-
ners with the health insurances through selective 
contracts. At the same time, the government intro-
duced a start-up financing fund of up to almost 700 
million euros, i.e. 1 percent of the entire compen-
sation of physicians and hospitals. The attractive 
financial support triggered a boost in integrated 
care contracts. Within four years, approximately 
6,000 contracts were concluded (Amelung et al., 
2012: 2). Nevertheless, the dynamic development 
collapsed immediately after the expiration of the 
start-up financing fund at the end of 2008. Today 
there are still more than 6,000 contracts, but their 
share of total expenses stagnates below 1 percent 
of total health care expenses (Sachverständigenrat, 
2012: 349). Even successful pilot projects which 
have proved capable of lowering expenditure and 
improving health care quality remain regional and 
are not applied to improve health care provision na-
tionwide (Hildebrandt et al., 2008). 
The stagnation of integrated care in Germany is not 
a new issue (Amelung, Wolf, 2012). However, to this 
day, the central obstacles to integrated care have 
not been addressed by the German government. In-
stead, the recent health care reform on medical pro-
vision – the Health Care Structure Law which took 
effect in January 2012 – introduced new instru-
ments for interdisciplinary and cross-sector models 
of care such as mandatory discharge management 
for hospitals. Moreover, an outpatient specialist 
care sector, in which inpatient as well as SHI-au-
thorized physicians can equally take part, has been 
established. This is a new approach which can con-
tribute to reducing the frictional losses at the sec-
tor boundaries (Amelung et al., 2012: 3). However, 
it does not eliminate the barriers to integrated care 
and selective contracting. Instead of pluralistic pro-
vision, the government chooses the path of obliga-
tion (discharge management) and instead of tearing 
the sector borders down, it establishes an additional 
new sector (outpatient specialist care).
3. Approaches for More Competition
Competitive pressure can be created by means of 
two components: price and quality. The potential 
for price competition in the German healthcare 
system is highly restricted. On the insurance mar-
ket, price competition is only accepted socially and 
politically as long as it does not jeopardize the sick-
ness funds’ economic situation. The most recent 
healthcare reform act shows very clearly that the 
German government fears the selective power of 
competition. Therefore, price competition on the 
insurance market is substantially limited by poli-
tics. It must be concluded that the political goal of 
strengthening competition on the insurance market 
has eroded more and more. The introduction of 
the Health Funds in 2009 was already an important 
step towards levelling the insurance market. With 
the decision in favour of income-related additional 
premiums, the government is abandoning the last 
component of the competition-oriented model of 
the Flat-Rate Health Contribution Model.
On the market for medical services, price competi-
tion is rejected on principle. This is shown by the 
example of the so-called ‘doctor’s office visit fee’ 
(Praxisgebühr), i.e. a medical consultation fee of 
10 euros per quarter. In November 2012, the Ger-
man parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) abolished 
this small out-of-pocket payment with a historical 
voting result of 100 percent (Bundesministerium 
für Gesundheit, 2012). As soon as people gain the 
impression that medical provision depends on the 
willingness to pay or – even worse – on the abil-
ity to pay, many people resist. Price competition is, 
at best, accepted on the market for contracts – but 
only when it means achieving cost-savings due to 
rebate contracts (Amelung et al., 2013).
Consequently, the principle aim of the German 
government is creating quality-based competition. 
However, there are tight limits here too. As the 
heated debate around the abolition of the reim-
bursement of dentures has confirmed, it is political-
ly almost impossible to reduce the benefit catalogue 
God. XXVII, BR. 2/2014. str. 463-472
468 God. XXVII, BR. 2/2014. str. 463-472
of the SHI. Consequently, the sickness funds are 
faced with the challenge of differing in quality de-
spite the benefit catalogue being almost completely 
predefined and unchangeable. The qualitative pa-
rameters of competition are structure and process 
optimization, coordination, supervision, lifestyle-
products and services. As shown in chapter 2.2, 
sickness funds and service providers have a large 
number of tools at their proposal to influence medi-
cal provision and to design treatment processes and 
structures. However, it is obvious that the legislator 
has underestimated the inertia of the various actors 
in the sphere of public health and the healthcare 
sector (Amelung, Wolf, 2013). Medical provision in 
Germany is still dominated by collective decision-
making and uniform provision. The apparent con-
tradiction between the huge number of 6,000 selec-
tive contracts and only one percent proportion of 
health care expenditure can be understood by look-
ing at the different contract competition fields.
Innovative forms of care and healthcare delivery 
are interesting for sickness funds if they involve a 
low level of economic risk and if they are attractive 
for large groups of insured persons. For this reason, 
they concentrate their activities on indication-ori-
ented models of care which deal with widespread 
diseases such as depression and back pain. Com-
mon treatment methods such as endoprosthetics 
are also lucrative. Moreover, sickness funds often 
offer alternative treatment methods which are likely 
to attract young and healthy members and can be 
used for public relations. Competition is fully func-
tional in these segments.
In contrast, contract competition is insufficient in 
the field of ambitious structural innovations and 
population-oriented approaches, especially when 
it is difficult to reach large groups of insurants. 
Sickness funds are still reluctant to undertake high 
initial investments when the return to investment 
is exposed to a relatively high risk. There are also 
not enough incentives on the part of the service 
providers. A physician does not agree to a selective 
contract if the share of his or her patients who are 
affected is too low. This is particularly the case if 
the healthcare model is regionally limited and the 
market share of the sickness fund is low. After all, 
there are a lot of successful pilot projects, but these 
models usually fail when it comes to finding financi-
ers for permanent realization after the pilot phase 
has been completed. 
The third task of contract competition is to open up 
a new field of experimentation for quality and ef-
ficiency, improving process innovations which are 
not necessarily cross-sector or interdisciplinary. 
Until now, there has been no legal basis for the re-
alization of such innovative forms of care. For such 
projects, sickness funds often use the legal basis for 
Integrated Care (Sections 140 a-d SGB V). How-
ever, this entails the risk of the regulatory author-
ity refusing its consent. A prominent example is 
the primary care physicians and primary care phar-
macists model of the Barmer Ersatzkasse. 18,000 
pharmacists and 38,000 physicians were involved in 
the project for which the Federal Social Court (Bun-
dessozialgericht) refused approval purely on formal 
grounds (Amelung, Wolf, 2013: 116).
4. Lessons learned
Implementing dynamic contract competition would 
require two steps: first, the willingness to invest 
must be promoted. Second, a simple and easy to 
understand legal basis is needed which enables the 
introduction of innovative care concepts in a less 
bureaucratic way.
Investment requires investors being willing to as-
sume risk. However, in the German healthcare 
sector, neither the sickness funds nor the service 
providers are characterized by readiness to assume 
risk. For the sickness funds, the risks outweigh the 
advantages. As a corporation under public law, a 
statutory sickness fund is obligated to think in year-
ly budgets. Innovative care models often demand 
high initial investments, but the return on invest-
ment usually comes in three to five years. Thus, the 
risk and the use of resources necessary for innova-
tive care reforms are often classified as unreason-
ably high. In order to change this, health insurances 
could be given more flexible entrepreneurial leeway 
which would also allow them to invest in projects 
whose revenue may only accrue in some years’ time. 
In addition, innovation budgets could be introduced 
in health insurances for the development of innova-
tive forms of care. To ensure that the funds are ap-
propriated used, standardized evaluation would be 
inevitable (Amelung et al., 2012). 
Many service providers are dissatisfied due to their 
high workload and the earning potential in the SHI. 
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However, there is only low economic pressure to be 
involved in selective contracts. Consequently, there 
is too little initiative from the service providers. Al-
most none of them need be afraid of being excluded 
from the system. Moreover, many physicians fear 
that a change in the structure of care could restrict 
their authority, increase surveillance and interfere 
with their freedom of treatment. Thus, beyond the 
compensation system, incentives could be offered 
to physicians for their participation in innovative 
forms of care. Pay for performance would enable 
each party to attain additional income through indi-
vidual performance and would enforce the desired 
quality-based competition (Amelung et al., 2012). 
Despite this, establishing pay for performance in 
the SHI is not under serious consideration. There 
are however some few tentative experiments with 
pay for performance elements e.g. in the general 
practitioner care contract in Baden-Württemberg.
Since the Healthcare Modernization Act in 2004, 
the government’s ambition to strengthen contract 
competition has significantly diminished. In 2004, 
integrated care and contract competition were 
praised as a solution for more quality and efficiency 
in healthcare. However, at least since the ‘Health-
care Structure Act’ in 2012, it is obvious that poli-
ticians have changed their minds. The focus has 
shifted from integrated care to the so-called ‘Out-
Patient Specialist Care’ (Ambulante Spezialfachär-
ztliche Versorgung, Section 116 b SGB V), i.e. a 
new form of cross-sectional and interdisciplinary 
co-operation. Without going as far as debating the 
pros and cons of ‘Out-Patient Specialist Care’, it is 
clear that this new form of care is only suitable for 
a handful of medical indications. Thus it can only 
improve medical provision selectively. It is certain 
that overcoming the boundaries between the differ-
ent healthcare sectors requires integrated care.
From this point of view, the coalition agreement of 
the new federal German government is encourag-
ing. With the aim of boosting integrated care and 
selective contract competition, the Grand Coalition 
has announced the introduction of a new form of 
start-up financing and a substantial simplification 
of the legal basis for innovative care concepts (Koa-
litionsvertrag, 2013). This combination of start-up 
financing and legislative simplification may succeed 
in giving a clear impetus for innovative healthcare 
concepts. These announcements have been recently 
considered in the draft bill of the law on strengthen-
ing the provision of healthcare in the SHI (Gesetz 
zur Stärkung der Versorgung in der gesetzlichen 
Krankenversicherung).
5. Conclusion
To evaluate the effectiveness of competition in the 
SHI, the insurance market and the market for se-
lective contracts must both be analysed separately. 
At least since introduction of the Health Fund, a 
trend towards less competition and more levelling 
can be observed on the insurance market. More in-
dependence for the sickness funds to set the level 
of contributions is urgently needed. In contrast, on 
the market for selective contracts, an ambivalent 
picture emerges. On the one hand, several possi-
bilities for establishing new forms of healthcare and 
strengthening competition have been introduced. 
On the other hand, it is safe to say that the initial eu-
phoria has since dissipated. Sickness funds as well 
as service providers are often reluctant to enter into 
selective contracts. To strengthen competition two 
things are required: first, the willingness to invest 
must be promoted. Second, a simple and easy to 
understand legal basis is needed which enables the 
introduction of innovative care concepts in a less 
bureaucratic way. The current draft bill of the law 
on strengthening the provision of healthcare in the 
SHI includes the relevant measures for overcoming 
the rigidity of the German healthcare system. How-
ever, it is the implementation that now becomes 
important.
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Sascha Wolf
Volker Amelung 
Izjednačavanje nasuprot tržišnom natjecanju – 
politički obrat u trendovima njemačkog 
zdravstvenog sustava?
Sažetak
Gotovo 20 godina njemačka savezna vlada tvrdi da tržišno natjecanje ima ključnu ulogu u osiguravanju 
financijske održivosti zdravstvenoga sustava. Cilj ovoga rada je istražiti je li njemačka vlada doista slijedila 
izravan put prema jačanju tržišnoga natjecanja. U tu svrhu, provedena je kvalitativna analiza najvažnijih 
zakona o reformi zdravstva. Zaključeno je da se uočava jasan trend većeg izjednačavanja i propisivanja, 
pogotovo od uvođenja Fonda za zdravstveno osiguranje 2009. godine. Taj trend potvrđuje i najnoviji Zakon 
o reformi zdravstva iz lipnja 2014. Ukidanje paušalne premije odraz je straha Vlade da bi pritisak konkuren-
cije mogao ugroziti solventnost i održivost fondova za zdravstveno osiguranje (fondova za obvezno zdravst-
veno osiguranje). Nasuprot tome, na tržištu za ugovore o selektivnoj distribuciji javlja se ambivalentna slika. 
S jedne strane, uvedeno je nekoliko mogućnosti uspostavljanja novih oblika zdravstvene zaštite i jačanja 
tržišnog natjecanja. S druge strane, fondovi za zdravstveno osiguranje, kao i davatelji usluga, često nevoljko 
sklapaju ugovore o selektivnoj distribuciji.
 
Ključne riječi: njemački zdravstveni sustav, Fond za zdravstveno osiguranje, konkurentnost ugovora, inte-
grirana zaštita, inovacijski fond
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